The Discerning Texan
All that is necessary for evil to triumph, is for good men to do nothing.
-- Edmund Burke
-- Edmund Burke
Saturday, January 28, 2006
Hugh Hewitt Interviews Robert Kaplan
On my latest jaunt to South America, I took with me a copy of Robert Kaplan's Imperial Grunts, and it is riveting. This is a book where Kaplan visits American Special-Ops troops deployed in numerous global hot spots (some of which you haven't even heard of....), and I cannot say enough good things about this book, and of the incredibly positive impression it gives of the sheer professionalism of our military abroad. So naturally when I saw that one of my favorite hosts (Hugh Hewitt) interviewed Kaplan about the book (transcribed as usual by the meticulous Radio Blogger):
HH: Everything going on, but in the middle of all that, there's been one theme. I don't know if you've listened to it very closely. I keep bringing up a book. It's a book called Imperial Grunts. I've had its author on before, but now I'm rejoined by Robert Kaplan, because Robert, I want to talk to you a little bit about this. Welcome back. Thanks for making some time this afternoon.
RK: It's my pleasure to be here, Hugh.
HH: Now Robert, I asked the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, and neither of them yet had the chance to read your book. But I asked them specifically about the idea that Special Forces at the forward operating bases, which you described in meticulous detail in Afghanistan and other places, are being constrained by a big Army, as you put it, at Bagram and other places, and they deflected the question. And I didn't have enough time to push them and go deep on this. They just were non-responsive. What do you think that indicates?
RK: Well, I think to be fair to them, it indicates how de-centralized the system is. I'll tell you a story. I had a piece on U.S. Marines training in a country in sub-Saharan Africa, Niger. And it reached the office of the Secretary of Defense, and some people said wow, we had no idea we had people there. And that would have happened it Willian Cohen was Secretary of Defense, William Perry. It's not a reflection on the Republicans. It's a reflection of how de-centralized the system is. Unless there's something uniquely controversial about the deployment, this is something that's going to be decided at the level of European command and Schtutgard, if it's Africa for instance. So let's get back to the Special Forces bases. These are issues that are basically decided, in the case of an Army Special Forces, a forward operating base, or fire base as they call it, in Afghanistan, it would be decided at the level of the two star general at Bagram, in Afghanistan, and would not go up to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may have like an overarching order that I want as little bureaucracy as possible. I want our people unconstrained. But the problem is that those are all general commands, which can be interpreted in so many different ways as you go down the chain. And the Vice President being further above, probably knows even less about this.
HH: That's remarkable. But it is a real problem. Is it getting remedied?
RK: See, this goes back to one of the main points in my book, that many of the policy discussions in Washington and New York are so ill-informed, because they often know even less than these people about how all this stuff is being carried out.
HH: Right.
RK: And the people who are best qualified to, say, write an op-ed is a staff sergeant somewhere, who would never even think of reading the editorial page of a newspaper, let alone submitting an op-ed.
HH: Right.
RK: My in-feeling is that things have gotten better.
HH: All right. Now Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army, was also my guest in the last week, and I asked him where are we going with Special Forces in terms of numbers. He said 16,000 by '09. Is that enough?
RK: Right. Yeah, in the quadrennial defense review, which I think will be out next month, I expect to see a whopping increase in Army Special Forces. I believe right now there are about 9,000 Green Berets over about five active duty groups, and two National Guard reserve groups. So that's going to go up by about a third or so. But remember, you cannot produce Special Operations Forces overnight. It takes years to produce them. That's why they're special. So what it means is they will begin recruiting, in the hope of training and develop...and ramping up this force from 9 to 16,000 over the next two or three years or so. But again, let me emphasize that the real issue, in terms of our military is not Special Ops, it's the regular Army.
HH: Now Robert Kaplan, I want to again know the book is Imperial Grunts. I've linked it many times at Hughhewitt.com. Go to Amazon.com. And I've been through it now twice. It's really epic. And I want to ask this question particularly of you, because I don't think there's an American journalist at work today who has spent more time with the American military over the last three years. I think that's just an objective statement.
RK: Well, let me put it this way. There are a lot of great reporters doing great work, men and women, in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it's very hard to find people who even want to go to all these other places that I've been. And in many cases, it's not because they lack the curiosity or willingness. It's that they can't get their editors to assign them to go.
HH: Sure. But there are lots who don't exactly want to deploy from Kuwait across the Iraqi desert as you did in that last great wheeling motion with the Marines. That was fascinating, logistically.
RK: Yeah, well that's one of the advantages, Hugh, of being a magazine writer, and not writing on deadline, and having to file a great piece in three or four days.
HH: Right.
RK: You know, it's one of the advantages of being able to let a piece marinate and develop over weeks.
HH: Well, yesterday in the Los Angeles Times, a young writer, not so young, 35, by the name of Joel Stein, wrote a piece that began, I don't support the troops, and ended with a declaration that parades should not be given for them when they return. Did you see that piece, Robert?
RK: No, I didn't. Frankly, I didn't.
HH: If you have a chance to, I would encourage you to read it and write something. And I actually hope you'll put it in the L.A. Times, because it needs to be answered by someone like you. But when you see someone who is esteemed by many as a fine talent and a writer, write I don't support the troops, what are they missing?
RK: Well, first of all, I had a piece in the L.A. Times, to be fair to the L.A. Times, in late December, making the exact opposite point. And the piece basically said that the future of America is being written in Iraq, because all the future great politicians are right now captains and lieutenants in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because they will be the first greatest generation in history that will have real on the ground democratic governance experience, unlike previous war veterans that we've had.
HH: Oh, that's interesting.
RK: All right. Basically, what I think they're missing is that we frankly live in a society that has been...that is divided up into all these sub-groups, because of its size and complexity. We have not had a draft for a third of a century, so that the military is this mysterious kind of vestigial other. There's something like retrograde about it. People feel they have to say nice things about it. It's not, you know, it's not...in good polite company now, you always have to praise the troops. But deep down, particularly on the left, though obviously a lot of people on the left don't fall into this category, but a sizeable minority do. There's just this roiling kind of angst that they really don't support the troops. And the reason is because they have no real social connection with troops.
HH: That's actually how I...
RK: I mean, their social connection is limited to like watching a retired general on TV, or going to a seminar and hearing Wesley Clark or something like that, or maybe, if they're really, really curious, they'll hear a few colonels at the Council on Foreign Rela...who are always fellows at the Council On Foreign Relations, or who are always fellows at the Harvard Kennedy School. But of course, as you and I know, high-ranking officers, as high-ranking officers will tell you, is not at all what the military's about.
HH: Yeah, I was unfair to him when I had him on the air yesterday, because I pop quizzed how much do these guys make, and I'd read your book, so I was up to speed on everything.
RK: Yeah, you know, this is a reflection about how...like the military is a whole separate branch of society that a lot of policy people, intellectual...they're people they never encounter around the Thanksgiving dinner table.
HH: Last question, Robert Kaplan. And I hope before you deploy again, we'll talk to you at length, because I'd like to go chapter by chapter. The drone took out Zawahiri's buddies. That said to me that we're getting much more aggressive than when you were there. Did it say the same thing to you?
RK: It said something analogous, but different. It's that we've solved some diplomatic issues with the Pakistani government, that allows us to operate over the border in a way that we couldn't in '03 when I wrote that chapter. We've somehow come to some understanding in a very like unwritten, informal way with Musharraf, that there are things we can do now that we couldn't do a year or two ago.
HH: And that's what's going to be fascinating when you go back, is how our imperial grunts have seen the world change in front of them as they've deployed. When are you going back?
RK: Well, actually, I'm leaving Sunday for a month with the Air Force in Korea and Thailand. And...
HH: You're going to Korea in January?
RK: Yes. I've got to do it. I mean, a real traveler goes to places during the worst time of year.
HH: I'm trying to remember Hayam Potok's book about light. It's about a Korean guy, or an American stationed there in the Winter, and it made me freezing just to read it.
RK: Yeah. But in the Spring, I hope to be back in Colombia for the first time in three years, back in the Philipines for the first time in two years, back in sub-Saharan Africa for the first time in a year and a half, all with the same units.
HH: Whenever you get near a phone, Robert Kaplan, please call us and let us know if you feel like talking.
RK: Well, it's a pleasure you having me on, Hugh. Thank you so much.
HH: Thank you. Make sure you get that book, America. Imperial Grunts. If you want to fill in the knowledge gap, that's the place to begin. Imperial Grunts.
HH: Everything going on, but in the middle of all that, there's been one theme. I don't know if you've listened to it very closely. I keep bringing up a book. It's a book called Imperial Grunts. I've had its author on before, but now I'm rejoined by Robert Kaplan, because Robert, I want to talk to you a little bit about this. Welcome back. Thanks for making some time this afternoon.
RK: It's my pleasure to be here, Hugh.
HH: Now Robert, I asked the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, and neither of them yet had the chance to read your book. But I asked them specifically about the idea that Special Forces at the forward operating bases, which you described in meticulous detail in Afghanistan and other places, are being constrained by a big Army, as you put it, at Bagram and other places, and they deflected the question. And I didn't have enough time to push them and go deep on this. They just were non-responsive. What do you think that indicates?
RK: Well, I think to be fair to them, it indicates how de-centralized the system is. I'll tell you a story. I had a piece on U.S. Marines training in a country in sub-Saharan Africa, Niger. And it reached the office of the Secretary of Defense, and some people said wow, we had no idea we had people there. And that would have happened it Willian Cohen was Secretary of Defense, William Perry. It's not a reflection on the Republicans. It's a reflection of how de-centralized the system is. Unless there's something uniquely controversial about the deployment, this is something that's going to be decided at the level of European command and Schtutgard, if it's Africa for instance. So let's get back to the Special Forces bases. These are issues that are basically decided, in the case of an Army Special Forces, a forward operating base, or fire base as they call it, in Afghanistan, it would be decided at the level of the two star general at Bagram, in Afghanistan, and would not go up to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may have like an overarching order that I want as little bureaucracy as possible. I want our people unconstrained. But the problem is that those are all general commands, which can be interpreted in so many different ways as you go down the chain. And the Vice President being further above, probably knows even less about this.
HH: That's remarkable. But it is a real problem. Is it getting remedied?
RK: See, this goes back to one of the main points in my book, that many of the policy discussions in Washington and New York are so ill-informed, because they often know even less than these people about how all this stuff is being carried out.
HH: Right.
RK: And the people who are best qualified to, say, write an op-ed is a staff sergeant somewhere, who would never even think of reading the editorial page of a newspaper, let alone submitting an op-ed.
HH: Right.
RK: My in-feeling is that things have gotten better.
HH: All right. Now Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army, was also my guest in the last week, and I asked him where are we going with Special Forces in terms of numbers. He said 16,000 by '09. Is that enough?
RK: Right. Yeah, in the quadrennial defense review, which I think will be out next month, I expect to see a whopping increase in Army Special Forces. I believe right now there are about 9,000 Green Berets over about five active duty groups, and two National Guard reserve groups. So that's going to go up by about a third or so. But remember, you cannot produce Special Operations Forces overnight. It takes years to produce them. That's why they're special. So what it means is they will begin recruiting, in the hope of training and develop...and ramping up this force from 9 to 16,000 over the next two or three years or so. But again, let me emphasize that the real issue, in terms of our military is not Special Ops, it's the regular Army.
HH: Now Robert Kaplan, I want to again know the book is Imperial Grunts. I've linked it many times at Hughhewitt.com. Go to Amazon.com. And I've been through it now twice. It's really epic. And I want to ask this question particularly of you, because I don't think there's an American journalist at work today who has spent more time with the American military over the last three years. I think that's just an objective statement.
RK: Well, let me put it this way. There are a lot of great reporters doing great work, men and women, in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it's very hard to find people who even want to go to all these other places that I've been. And in many cases, it's not because they lack the curiosity or willingness. It's that they can't get their editors to assign them to go.
HH: Sure. But there are lots who don't exactly want to deploy from Kuwait across the Iraqi desert as you did in that last great wheeling motion with the Marines. That was fascinating, logistically.
RK: Yeah, well that's one of the advantages, Hugh, of being a magazine writer, and not writing on deadline, and having to file a great piece in three or four days.
HH: Right.
RK: You know, it's one of the advantages of being able to let a piece marinate and develop over weeks.
HH: Well, yesterday in the Los Angeles Times, a young writer, not so young, 35, by the name of Joel Stein, wrote a piece that began, I don't support the troops, and ended with a declaration that parades should not be given for them when they return. Did you see that piece, Robert?
RK: No, I didn't. Frankly, I didn't.
HH: If you have a chance to, I would encourage you to read it and write something. And I actually hope you'll put it in the L.A. Times, because it needs to be answered by someone like you. But when you see someone who is esteemed by many as a fine talent and a writer, write I don't support the troops, what are they missing?
RK: Well, first of all, I had a piece in the L.A. Times, to be fair to the L.A. Times, in late December, making the exact opposite point. And the piece basically said that the future of America is being written in Iraq, because all the future great politicians are right now captains and lieutenants in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because they will be the first greatest generation in history that will have real on the ground democratic governance experience, unlike previous war veterans that we've had.
HH: Oh, that's interesting.
RK: All right. Basically, what I think they're missing is that we frankly live in a society that has been...that is divided up into all these sub-groups, because of its size and complexity. We have not had a draft for a third of a century, so that the military is this mysterious kind of vestigial other. There's something like retrograde about it. People feel they have to say nice things about it. It's not, you know, it's not...in good polite company now, you always have to praise the troops. But deep down, particularly on the left, though obviously a lot of people on the left don't fall into this category, but a sizeable minority do. There's just this roiling kind of angst that they really don't support the troops. And the reason is because they have no real social connection with troops.
HH: That's actually how I...
RK: I mean, their social connection is limited to like watching a retired general on TV, or going to a seminar and hearing Wesley Clark or something like that, or maybe, if they're really, really curious, they'll hear a few colonels at the Council on Foreign Rela...who are always fellows at the Council On Foreign Relations, or who are always fellows at the Harvard Kennedy School. But of course, as you and I know, high-ranking officers, as high-ranking officers will tell you, is not at all what the military's about.
HH: Yeah, I was unfair to him when I had him on the air yesterday, because I pop quizzed how much do these guys make, and I'd read your book, so I was up to speed on everything.
RK: Yeah, you know, this is a reflection about how...like the military is a whole separate branch of society that a lot of policy people, intellectual...they're people they never encounter around the Thanksgiving dinner table.
HH: Last question, Robert Kaplan. And I hope before you deploy again, we'll talk to you at length, because I'd like to go chapter by chapter. The drone took out Zawahiri's buddies. That said to me that we're getting much more aggressive than when you were there. Did it say the same thing to you?
RK: It said something analogous, but different. It's that we've solved some diplomatic issues with the Pakistani government, that allows us to operate over the border in a way that we couldn't in '03 when I wrote that chapter. We've somehow come to some understanding in a very like unwritten, informal way with Musharraf, that there are things we can do now that we couldn't do a year or two ago.
HH: And that's what's going to be fascinating when you go back, is how our imperial grunts have seen the world change in front of them as they've deployed. When are you going back?
RK: Well, actually, I'm leaving Sunday for a month with the Air Force in Korea and Thailand. And...
HH: You're going to Korea in January?
RK: Yes. I've got to do it. I mean, a real traveler goes to places during the worst time of year.
HH: I'm trying to remember Hayam Potok's book about light. It's about a Korean guy, or an American stationed there in the Winter, and it made me freezing just to read it.
RK: Yeah. But in the Spring, I hope to be back in Colombia for the first time in three years, back in the Philipines for the first time in two years, back in sub-Saharan Africa for the first time in a year and a half, all with the same units.
HH: Whenever you get near a phone, Robert Kaplan, please call us and let us know if you feel like talking.
RK: Well, it's a pleasure you having me on, Hugh. Thank you so much.
HH: Thank you. Make sure you get that book, America. Imperial Grunts. If you want to fill in the knowledge gap, that's the place to begin. Imperial Grunts.
