The Discerning Texan
All that is necessary for evil to triumph, is for good men to do nothing.
-- Edmund Burke
-- Edmund Burke
Monday, May 08, 2006
Captured Iraqi Al Qaeda Documents (paraphrased): "We're getting our butts kicked"
There is nothing like getting an insight into the enemy's own private thoughts to know how the war is REALLY going. And as Captain Ed reports, CENTCOM has captured documents which reveal that the Al Qaeda leadership in Iraq.....well, to put it mildly, let's just say they were not brimming with overconfidence:
CENTCOM announced today that they had captured al-Qaeda correspondence in Iraq that discusses the state of the insurgency, especially around Baghdad but also around the entire country. Far from optimistic, the documents captured in an April 16th raid reveal frustration and desperation, as the terrorists acknowledge the superior position of American and free Iraqi forces and their ability to quickly adapt to new tactics.
In these passages, the AQ terrorist author -- described as a person "of significance" due to the extensive analysis applied -- often refers to the elected Iraqi government as the "Shi'ites":
A glance at the reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events (sectarian turmoil)
1. It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. The only power the mujahidin have is what they have already demonstrated in hunting down drifted patrols and taking sniper shots at those patrol members who stray far from their patrols, or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the government. In other words, these activities could be understood as hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which is an image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.
The author of this analysis acknowledges two truths. First, rather than representing any real existential threat to the government, the insurgency only rises to the level of a "daily annoyance". This clashes with the depiction in the American media of the Zarqawi network as a mass destabilizer, a description that even AQ rejects. The terror analyst also recognizes that the tactics used by the terrorist network have largely alienated even the Sunnis by killing those who represent no threat to AQ -- the "scared and the hiding ones". AQ, he says, needs an image makeover.
2. The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad are generally groups of assassin without any organized military capabilities.
3. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join[t] operations.
This passage admits that the foreign insurgents not only do not have any organization or military capabilities, but also resist coordination. In some ways, that makes discovering and neutralizing them more difficult, but it also keeps AQ from holding any territory or controlling the area in any meaningful way. Their assets in Baghdad cannot even coordinate with each other to carry out joint operations, indicating a poor system of communications -- likely brought about by American and Iraqi offensives against the network.
4. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction.
This direction has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied with it alone delays more important operations such as taking control of some areas, preserving it and assuming power in Baghdad (for example, taking control of a university, a hospital, or a Sunni religious site).
This is a frank admission that the only effect that AQ has made is to convince the media -- presumably the American media -- that the situation cannot be controlled, despite their acknowledgement that they represent nothing more than a nuisance. It also cautions against falling in love with seeing themselves on the TV, because the cost of such operations results in a lack of assets for holding real territory. Right now, they cannot even hold a university, let alone a city or suburb.
At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after the other. That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.
Read the rest here.
CENTCOM announced today that they had captured al-Qaeda correspondence in Iraq that discusses the state of the insurgency, especially around Baghdad but also around the entire country. Far from optimistic, the documents captured in an April 16th raid reveal frustration and desperation, as the terrorists acknowledge the superior position of American and free Iraqi forces and their ability to quickly adapt to new tactics.
In these passages, the AQ terrorist author -- described as a person "of significance" due to the extensive analysis applied -- often refers to the elected Iraqi government as the "Shi'ites":
A glance at the reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events (sectarian turmoil)
1. It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. The only power the mujahidin have is what they have already demonstrated in hunting down drifted patrols and taking sniper shots at those patrol members who stray far from their patrols, or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the government. In other words, these activities could be understood as hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which is an image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.
The author of this analysis acknowledges two truths. First, rather than representing any real existential threat to the government, the insurgency only rises to the level of a "daily annoyance". This clashes with the depiction in the American media of the Zarqawi network as a mass destabilizer, a description that even AQ rejects. The terror analyst also recognizes that the tactics used by the terrorist network have largely alienated even the Sunnis by killing those who represent no threat to AQ -- the "scared and the hiding ones". AQ, he says, needs an image makeover.
2. The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad are generally groups of assassin without any organized military capabilities.
3. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join[t] operations.
This passage admits that the foreign insurgents not only do not have any organization or military capabilities, but also resist coordination. In some ways, that makes discovering and neutralizing them more difficult, but it also keeps AQ from holding any territory or controlling the area in any meaningful way. Their assets in Baghdad cannot even coordinate with each other to carry out joint operations, indicating a poor system of communications -- likely brought about by American and Iraqi offensives against the network.
4. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction.
This direction has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied with it alone delays more important operations such as taking control of some areas, preserving it and assuming power in Baghdad (for example, taking control of a university, a hospital, or a Sunni religious site).
This is a frank admission that the only effect that AQ has made is to convince the media -- presumably the American media -- that the situation cannot be controlled, despite their acknowledgement that they represent nothing more than a nuisance. It also cautions against falling in love with seeing themselves on the TV, because the cost of such operations results in a lack of assets for holding real territory. Right now, they cannot even hold a university, let alone a city or suburb.
At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after the other. That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.
Read the rest here.
