The Discerning Texan
All that is necessary for evil to triumph, is for good men to do nothing.
-- Edmund Burke
-- Edmund Burke
Sunday, December 31, 2006
2007 Resolution for US: Take Jihad Seriously, Plan Strategically
Jeffrey Imm has a terrific assessment up on The Counterterrorism Blog which bears repetition here and elsewhere until a majority of his recommendations become ubiquitous policy. The analysis concerns the shortcomings of the United States thus far in thinking strategically about the long term war against global jihadism. His recommendations make a great New Year's Resolution for our government officials and military to focus on going forward. Let us hope someone out there is listening:
The United States of America has some of the smartest leaders in government, military, and business in the world. Yet the American government has failed to collectively use this formidable brain-power 5+ years after the attack by Jihadists on the American homeland to develop a truly strategic plan to fight the global threat of Jihad and Islamist extremism. In one of the most complex wars in American history, rather than starting with holistic, big-picture thinking towards the challenges and prioritizing resources and actions accordingly, America has spent much of the past five years after 9/11 in reactive and bureaucratic churning.
The recent reports about a lack of understanding of the role of individual Islamic groups in Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda by the new House Intelligence Panel Chairman and lack of knowledge of Sunni/Shiite groups by some FBI counterterrorism executives are not "isolated incidents". Nor is the limited number of FBI agents with Arabic language skills - five years after 9/11 - an "isolated problem". While these stories may exaggerate the limitations and educational challenges in such groups, they highlight the problem for American government in prioritization of education and resources, due to lack of a fundamental blueprint and analysis in understanding the larger problem of Jihad and global Islamist extremism. This lack of a blueprint prevents the government leadership from effectively evaluating options and priorities.
Recently, Air Force Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler has stated that the fight against Islamist extremism will be a "generational war" with both military and ideological components comparable to the Cold War against Communism. However, what Brig. General Schissler does not share is the national blueprint that America needs to be using for this generational war, that has been reviewed and analyzed by national leaders and scholars of Jihad and global Islamist extremism, that is needed for such a long-term effort, which is vastly more than simply military and "counterterrorism" activities. As Douglas Farah has pointed out, "[t]here is very little work being done in looking at the 10 to 20 year horizon on where Islamists are now", but mostly 3 to 5 year horizon thinking typically done n the Pentagon and Intelligence Community. This is yet another symptom of the larger problem in the lack of any larger, overall national strategic blueprint that focuses on all aspects of the global challenge.
The American government has been able to develop a group to investigate and issue a report on the 9/11 attacks, resulting in a 9/11 Commission Report, and now an Iraq Study Group, but it has yet to develop a cross-section of American scholars and leaders to research and develop a strategy on national countermeasures against global Jihad and Islamist extremist activity. There is no "Islamist Study Group" or "Jihadist Study Group" as a blueprint for government countermeasures in the larger global war, which requires greater political fortitude to face up to. As a result, American policy is focused on individual tactics in military battles in individual countries, and strategic assumptions related to "counterterrorism" and "homeland security" tactics - all of which, while more politically correct, provide a false sense of accomplishment. None of these tactical focuses can replace the need for a larger, strategic vision that encompasses all tactical aspects of the war, including but not limited to: cultural, demographic, economic, energy, educational, communications, intelligence (domestic and foreign), preparedness, law enforcement, and military areas.
Individuals have provided ground-breaking efforts to provide components of such a blueprint. For example, Walid Phares has provided a thorough analysis of Islamist groups in his book "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America", and has been promoting more thorough education on Jihad. Mark Steyn has provided an incisive analysis of cultural and demographic challenges in his recent book "America Alone". Steven Emerson provided ground-breaking work in analyzing the Jihadist groups in America in his book "American Jihad". Robert Spencer has provided in depth analysis of the Islamist basis for Jihad in his many books. Numerous other scholars have provided valuable educational components to be used in a national blueprint that is yet to be created to guide America's efforts in fighting Jihadists. But the blueprint effort has not yet started, and it must be a priority for the American government in 2007.
In 2004, the Netherlands government published a study, "From Dawa to Jihad", detailing the threats from radical Islam. The value of this type of study is in its focus towards studying the concepts of such Islamist extremism as a basis for a national debate on potential countermeasures. The American government needs these types of studies and a national debate on the larger strategic issues of the global Jihadist and Islamist challenge in 2007.
While the Jihadists and Islamists have no singular approach, the diverse factions of the enemy have a consistency in a long-term strategy towards imposing Sharia on an ever-expanding Islamist world or in establishing a caliphate. The ability of Jihadists and Islamists to focus on long-term, strategic planning is what the USA lacks in countering such challenges on a global basis, ranging from the more parochial objectives of Islamists in individual nations who seek to establish Islamist governments to the Al-Qaeda "20 year plan".
Why has the United States government been so incapable of addressing this national blueprint and study group for addressing Jihadist and Islamist threat?
There are multiple problems here:
1. Reactive, tactical thinking for quick-fix approaches to the Jihadist problem and achieving "homeland security". As virtually all of the government planning regarding the Jihadist problem has been a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, it is predictable that such thinking would be highly tactical, reactive, and focused on near-term protective and military measures. This was perhaps excusable or at least understandable 1 to 6 months after the 9/11 attacks. It is now 5+ years after 9/11 attacks, however, and this excuse has long since run its course. But the government approach towards addressing the Jihadist problem is no more robust or strategic than it was in the early months of 2002. The organizational approach to "homeland security" is based on such reactive thinking, and has developed a bureaucracy based on such organization. Yet there has been no determination as to what the term "homeland security" even means in a larger sense other than a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and certainly not as a component in a larger government blueprint regarding Jihad and global Islamism. Thus, there is no "homeland security" for the economy, culture, demographics, and dozens of other war components vital for winning the long term war.
2. Believing that fighting "terrorism" itself is an end, when terrorism is only one tactic in a larger, global Jihadist strategy. Thus, we have a "War on Terror", and neither the true enemy nor the true threat is clearly identified. Furthermore, the focus on both military objectives and "counterterrorism" lack context within a well-defined war strategy and blueprint regarding Jihad and global Islamism, which has uses many other tactics other than terrorism to meet its objectives. While it is acknowledged that no terrorist attacks have taken place on the American homeland since 9/11, Jihadists have been and continue to use communications tactics, demographic tactics, political tactics, and economic tactics quite effectively against the USA and the rest of the world. We are hampered by the language which makes "counterterrorism" and "counterintelligence" sound unnecessarily robust, when we are really only addressing measures against a single tactic of war in both cases. We would not fight a military war with only anti-tank or anti-aircraft measures. Moreover, we would not fight any war solely on a military front. But in this war, the American government has thus far only prioritized military and counterterrorism activities.
3. Institutional failure in investigating what the Jihadist problem is and fully understanding it or developing a shared understanding that can be used for strategic planning. The American government seems to believe any serious investigation into Jihad and Islamism will be counterproductive to winning the hearts and minds of Moderate Muslims in fighting terrorism. This argument makes sense if America is only fighting "terrorists" and "terrorist activity". But the facts are that Jihadist terrorist activity is funded, supported, and based on larger Islamist organizations - ranging from educational centers to charities to political groups. Ignoring the basis for Jihadist terrorism leads to an endless pursuit of trying to cure symptoms without ever acknowledging or treating the source of the symptoms. America did not fear offending Germans in fighting Nazism or offending Russians in fighting Communism. Like past wars in fighting totalitarian ideologies, a thorough understanding is needed of these and a comprehensive, strategic war plan against every tactic is needed against such Jihad.
4. Mistaking the use of strategic assumptions in tactical approaches to issues as "strategic thinking" on the larger threat. For example, Michael Chertoff has frequently indicated that one of the strategic assumptions of DHS is to prevent a nuclear attack on American soil, with appropriate tactical emphasis on this. Such strategic assumptions in general tactics in an element of a war are not the same as an overall strategic thinking in fighting the larger war, and looking at all aspects of the war (economic, energy, communications, cultural, demographic, etc.). But this surface-level of strategic assumptions in both counterterrorism and in military engagements are as far as the American government is currently going. Situational strategic assumptions are not the same as a long-term, big-picture, war strategy.
Objections to strategic thinking and planning are plentiful and well-rationalized. The multitude and rationalization for these objections, however, do not make them any less wrong. And it is precisely this lack of strategic thinking and planning that Jihadists are truly counting on. As Bin Laden has repeatedly stated, he hopes that America will bankrupt itself pursuing individual avenues of military conflict against Jihadists: "We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah".
In 2007, it is time for the American government to step back, evaluate and identify the scope of the threat of global Jihad and Islamism, and wisely prioritize the best way to use our limited resources to fight this generational war. The fight against Jihad is a marathon, not a sprint, and America needs to fight smarter to win.
The United States of America has some of the smartest leaders in government, military, and business in the world. Yet the American government has failed to collectively use this formidable brain-power 5+ years after the attack by Jihadists on the American homeland to develop a truly strategic plan to fight the global threat of Jihad and Islamist extremism. In one of the most complex wars in American history, rather than starting with holistic, big-picture thinking towards the challenges and prioritizing resources and actions accordingly, America has spent much of the past five years after 9/11 in reactive and bureaucratic churning.
The recent reports about a lack of understanding of the role of individual Islamic groups in Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda by the new House Intelligence Panel Chairman and lack of knowledge of Sunni/Shiite groups by some FBI counterterrorism executives are not "isolated incidents". Nor is the limited number of FBI agents with Arabic language skills - five years after 9/11 - an "isolated problem". While these stories may exaggerate the limitations and educational challenges in such groups, they highlight the problem for American government in prioritization of education and resources, due to lack of a fundamental blueprint and analysis in understanding the larger problem of Jihad and global Islamist extremism. This lack of a blueprint prevents the government leadership from effectively evaluating options and priorities.
Recently, Air Force Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler has stated that the fight against Islamist extremism will be a "generational war" with both military and ideological components comparable to the Cold War against Communism. However, what Brig. General Schissler does not share is the national blueprint that America needs to be using for this generational war, that has been reviewed and analyzed by national leaders and scholars of Jihad and global Islamist extremism, that is needed for such a long-term effort, which is vastly more than simply military and "counterterrorism" activities. As Douglas Farah has pointed out, "[t]here is very little work being done in looking at the 10 to 20 year horizon on where Islamists are now", but mostly 3 to 5 year horizon thinking typically done n the Pentagon and Intelligence Community. This is yet another symptom of the larger problem in the lack of any larger, overall national strategic blueprint that focuses on all aspects of the global challenge.
The American government has been able to develop a group to investigate and issue a report on the 9/11 attacks, resulting in a 9/11 Commission Report, and now an Iraq Study Group, but it has yet to develop a cross-section of American scholars and leaders to research and develop a strategy on national countermeasures against global Jihad and Islamist extremist activity. There is no "Islamist Study Group" or "Jihadist Study Group" as a blueprint for government countermeasures in the larger global war, which requires greater political fortitude to face up to. As a result, American policy is focused on individual tactics in military battles in individual countries, and strategic assumptions related to "counterterrorism" and "homeland security" tactics - all of which, while more politically correct, provide a false sense of accomplishment. None of these tactical focuses can replace the need for a larger, strategic vision that encompasses all tactical aspects of the war, including but not limited to: cultural, demographic, economic, energy, educational, communications, intelligence (domestic and foreign), preparedness, law enforcement, and military areas.
Individuals have provided ground-breaking efforts to provide components of such a blueprint. For example, Walid Phares has provided a thorough analysis of Islamist groups in his book "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America", and has been promoting more thorough education on Jihad. Mark Steyn has provided an incisive analysis of cultural and demographic challenges in his recent book "America Alone". Steven Emerson provided ground-breaking work in analyzing the Jihadist groups in America in his book "American Jihad". Robert Spencer has provided in depth analysis of the Islamist basis for Jihad in his many books. Numerous other scholars have provided valuable educational components to be used in a national blueprint that is yet to be created to guide America's efforts in fighting Jihadists. But the blueprint effort has not yet started, and it must be a priority for the American government in 2007.
In 2004, the Netherlands government published a study, "From Dawa to Jihad", detailing the threats from radical Islam. The value of this type of study is in its focus towards studying the concepts of such Islamist extremism as a basis for a national debate on potential countermeasures. The American government needs these types of studies and a national debate on the larger strategic issues of the global Jihadist and Islamist challenge in 2007.
While the Jihadists and Islamists have no singular approach, the diverse factions of the enemy have a consistency in a long-term strategy towards imposing Sharia on an ever-expanding Islamist world or in establishing a caliphate. The ability of Jihadists and Islamists to focus on long-term, strategic planning is what the USA lacks in countering such challenges on a global basis, ranging from the more parochial objectives of Islamists in individual nations who seek to establish Islamist governments to the Al-Qaeda "20 year plan".
Why has the United States government been so incapable of addressing this national blueprint and study group for addressing Jihadist and Islamist threat?
There are multiple problems here:
1. Reactive, tactical thinking for quick-fix approaches to the Jihadist problem and achieving "homeland security". As virtually all of the government planning regarding the Jihadist problem has been a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, it is predictable that such thinking would be highly tactical, reactive, and focused on near-term protective and military measures. This was perhaps excusable or at least understandable 1 to 6 months after the 9/11 attacks. It is now 5+ years after 9/11 attacks, however, and this excuse has long since run its course. But the government approach towards addressing the Jihadist problem is no more robust or strategic than it was in the early months of 2002. The organizational approach to "homeland security" is based on such reactive thinking, and has developed a bureaucracy based on such organization. Yet there has been no determination as to what the term "homeland security" even means in a larger sense other than a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and certainly not as a component in a larger government blueprint regarding Jihad and global Islamism. Thus, there is no "homeland security" for the economy, culture, demographics, and dozens of other war components vital for winning the long term war.
2. Believing that fighting "terrorism" itself is an end, when terrorism is only one tactic in a larger, global Jihadist strategy. Thus, we have a "War on Terror", and neither the true enemy nor the true threat is clearly identified. Furthermore, the focus on both military objectives and "counterterrorism" lack context within a well-defined war strategy and blueprint regarding Jihad and global Islamism, which has uses many other tactics other than terrorism to meet its objectives. While it is acknowledged that no terrorist attacks have taken place on the American homeland since 9/11, Jihadists have been and continue to use communications tactics, demographic tactics, political tactics, and economic tactics quite effectively against the USA and the rest of the world. We are hampered by the language which makes "counterterrorism" and "counterintelligence" sound unnecessarily robust, when we are really only addressing measures against a single tactic of war in both cases. We would not fight a military war with only anti-tank or anti-aircraft measures. Moreover, we would not fight any war solely on a military front. But in this war, the American government has thus far only prioritized military and counterterrorism activities.
3. Institutional failure in investigating what the Jihadist problem is and fully understanding it or developing a shared understanding that can be used for strategic planning. The American government seems to believe any serious investigation into Jihad and Islamism will be counterproductive to winning the hearts and minds of Moderate Muslims in fighting terrorism. This argument makes sense if America is only fighting "terrorists" and "terrorist activity". But the facts are that Jihadist terrorist activity is funded, supported, and based on larger Islamist organizations - ranging from educational centers to charities to political groups. Ignoring the basis for Jihadist terrorism leads to an endless pursuit of trying to cure symptoms without ever acknowledging or treating the source of the symptoms. America did not fear offending Germans in fighting Nazism or offending Russians in fighting Communism. Like past wars in fighting totalitarian ideologies, a thorough understanding is needed of these and a comprehensive, strategic war plan against every tactic is needed against such Jihad.
4. Mistaking the use of strategic assumptions in tactical approaches to issues as "strategic thinking" on the larger threat. For example, Michael Chertoff has frequently indicated that one of the strategic assumptions of DHS is to prevent a nuclear attack on American soil, with appropriate tactical emphasis on this. Such strategic assumptions in general tactics in an element of a war are not the same as an overall strategic thinking in fighting the larger war, and looking at all aspects of the war (economic, energy, communications, cultural, demographic, etc.). But this surface-level of strategic assumptions in both counterterrorism and in military engagements are as far as the American government is currently going. Situational strategic assumptions are not the same as a long-term, big-picture, war strategy.
Objections to strategic thinking and planning are plentiful and well-rationalized. The multitude and rationalization for these objections, however, do not make them any less wrong. And it is precisely this lack of strategic thinking and planning that Jihadists are truly counting on. As Bin Laden has repeatedly stated, he hopes that America will bankrupt itself pursuing individual avenues of military conflict against Jihadists: "We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah".
In 2007, it is time for the American government to step back, evaluate and identify the scope of the threat of global Jihad and Islamism, and wisely prioritize the best way to use our limited resources to fight this generational war. The fight against Jihad is a marathon, not a sprint, and America needs to fight smarter to win.
